tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9089358101708391552024-03-18T20:09:04.615-07:00appealinglawyerUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-908935810170839155.post-10012457938229737042007-03-23T17:26:00.000-07:002011-01-03T00:47:13.804-08:00Last Updated September 26, 2008<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhSysCM9OXtz0GLN7HeZZLAGPiR7xAxouR8hQ_djeOxjw_kHUTRKBWktY3zKVfTP26OBfR0pJBEUZIREgto2EuNT5YlaqtgefBwrjFVU2no-SgOivSAu4Lr60AK6V7qihckOkjrBOM9O1g/s1600-h/COLOR+JUNE+2006.JPG"><img style="margin:0px 10px 10px 0px;float:left" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhSysCM9OXtz0GLN7HeZZLAGPiR7xAxouR8hQ_djeOxjw_kHUTRKBWktY3zKVfTP26OBfR0pJBEUZIREgto2EuNT5YlaqtgefBwrjFVU2no-SgOivSAu4Lr60AK6V7qihckOkjrBOM9O1g/s200/COLOR+JUNE+2006.JPG" border="0"></a><br /><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%">This website lists and describes all currently pending civil cases in which the California Supreme Court has granted review, excluding those on grant and hold. The list is updated regularly by California appeals attorney Martin N. Buchanan, a partner at Niddrie, Fish & Buchanan in San Diego, California. The case descriptions come from the weekly News Release issued by the Public Information Office of the Administrative Office of the Courts. As stated in the News Release, the statement of issues does not necessarily reflect the view of the court, or define the specific issues that will be addressed by the court.<br /><br /><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)"><br />ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE</span></strong><br /><br /><strong>Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, No. S143087. </strong>Can the exception to the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) for actions "brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public" (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.17, subd. (b)) apply to a complaint that includes any claim for personal relief?<br /><br /><b><span>Simpson Strong-Tie Co. v. Gore, S164174</span></b><span>.<span> </span>(1) Which party bears the burden of persuasion with respect to the applicability of the anti-SLAPP exemptions set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17, subdivision (c)?<span> </span>(2) Does Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17, subdivision (c), exempt from anti-SLAPP protection an advertisement by a lawyer soliciting clients for a contemplated lawsuit?</span><br /></span><span style="font-size:100%"><br /></span><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0);font-size:100%"><strong>APPEALS & WRITS </strong><br /></span><span style="font-size:100%"><br /><strong>Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court, S156598.</strong> (1) May a Court of Appeal issue a “suggestive Palma notice” (see Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (l984) 36 Cal.3d 171) — that is, a notice that discusses the merits of a writ petition with citation to authority, determines that the trial court ruling was “erroneous,” and gives the trial court the “power and jurisdiction” to change its order? (2) If such an order is proper, absent exceptional circumstances, may it be issued without giving the real party in interest an opportunity to file opposition?<br /><br /></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong>In re Phoenix H., S155556.</strong> When appointed counsel for a parent whose custody rights have been adversely affected by state-initiated action files a brief in the Court of Appeal that presents no arguable claim of error, does the parent, acting in propria persona, have the right to submit a supplemental brief?<br /><br /></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong>Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles, No. S143929. </strong>Does the "prison delivery" rule apply to the filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case, and thus make timely a notice of appeal deposited in the prison legal mail system before the expiration of the jurisdictional deadline but not received by the trial court until after that deadline has passed?<br /><br /><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">ARBITRATION, MEDIATION & SETTLEMENT</span></strong><br /><strong></strong></span><span style="font-size:100%"><b><i><br />Haworth v. Superior Court, S165906</i></b>.<span> </span>(1) What is the scope of a neutral arbitrator’s required disclosures under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.9?<span> </span>(2) What is the proper standard of review of an order vacating an arbitration award based on an arbitrator’s purported failure to disclose grounds for disqualification?<br /></span><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />O’Hanesian v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., S149847.</strong> Does the arbitrator or the trial court decide whether a prior default judgment against the driver of an underinsured vehicle resolves the two questions — (a) whether the insured under an underinsured motorist insurance policy is entitled to collect damages from the driver and (b) if so, the amount — that the policy and Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (f), otherwise leave to the arbitrator?</span></div><span style="font-family:arial;font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />Schatz v. Allen Matkins Lack Gamble & Mallory LLP, S150371. </strong>Is enforcement of a preexisting arbitration agreement as to a fee dispute between an attorney and client precluded by the Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6200 et seq.)?<br /><br /></span><span style="font-size:100%"><span style="font-weight:bold;color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE</span><br /><br /><b>In re Marshall on Discipline, S156550</b>. Was admission to the Alternative Discipline Program appropriate in this attorney disciplinary matter? Were the required program and the discipline recommended by the State Bar Court in this matter a proper and adequate response to the member’s actions, or should this court impose a greater degree of discipline?<br /></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><br /><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS<br /></span><br /></strong><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong>Chavez v. City of Los Angeles, S162313.</strong> Does Code of Civil Procedure section 1033 permit a trial court to deny Government Code section 12965 attorney fees to the prevailing plaintiff in an action under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) if the judgment obtained in a court with jurisdiction over “unlimited” civil cases (see Code Civ. Proc., § 88) could have been rendered in a court with jurisdiction over “limited” civil cases (see Code Civ. Proc., § 85, subd. (a))?<br /><br /><b><span>County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, S163681</span></b><span>.<span> </span>May a public entity retain private counsel to prosecute a public nuisance abatement action under a contingent fee agreement?</span><br /></span><span style="font-size:100%"><br /></span><span style="font-size:100%"><b>Goodman v. Lozano, S162655</b></span><span style="font-size:100%">.<span> </span>When a plaintiff settles with one tortfeasor and goes to trial against another but obtains no additional recovery because the amount of damages awarded is less than the setoff amount based on the pretrial settlement, is that plaintiff nevertheless a prevailing party as a matter of law for purposes of an award of fees and costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032?<br /><br /></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span> </div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong>Musaelian v. Adams, S156045.</strong> Was defendant, an attorney representing himself in a civil action, entitled to an award of attorney fees as a sanction against the plaintiff under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 for engaging in frivolous litigation?<br /><br /><strong>Vasquez v. State of California, No. S143710. </strong>Does that rule that, in order to receive attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the plaintiff must first reasonably attempt to settle the matter short of litigation, apply to this case? (See Graham v. DaimerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 557; Grimsley v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 960, 966-967.)<br /><br /><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">BANKING</span></strong><br /><br /><strong></strong></span><span style="font-size:100%"><b><i><span>Imperial Merchants Services, Inc. v. Hunt, S163577</span></i></b><span>.<span> </span>May a debt collector recovering on a dishonored check impose both a service charge under Civil Code section 1719 and prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3287?<br /></span></span><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />Miller v. Bank of America, NT & SA, S149178.</strong> Does California law, which provides that a bank account into which public benefit funds or Social Security payments have been electronically deposited is exempt from attachment and execution, prohibit a bank from exercising its right to setoff as to charges — such as overdraft fees and insufficient fund fees — arising out of use of that same account?<br /><br /><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">CIVIL RIGHTS</span><br /><br /></strong><strong>Coral Construction v. City and County of San Francisco, S152934.</strong> (1) Does article I, section 31 of the California Constitution, which prohibits government entities from discrimination or preference on the basis of race, sex, or color in public contracting, improperly disadvantage minority groups and violate equal protection principles by making it more difficult to enact legislation on their behalf? (See Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 (1982) 458 U.S. 457; Hunter v. Erickson (1969) 393 U.S. 385.) (2) Is section 31 preempted by the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination? (3) Does an ordinance that provides certain advantages to minority- and female-owned business enterprises with respect to the award of city contracts fall within an exception to section 31 for actions required of a local governmental entity to maintain eligibility for federal funds under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000d)? (4) Did the Court of Appeal properly remand the case to the trial court to determine in the first instance whether the ordinance was required in order to maintain the local governmental entity’s eligibility for federal funds?<br /><br /></span><span style="font-size:100%"><b><span>Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., S162818</span></b></span><span style="font-size:100%">.<span> </span>(1) Must a plaintiff who seeks damages under California Civil Code section 52, claiming the denial of full and equal treatment on the basis of disability in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.), prove ‘intentional discrimination’? (2) If the answer to Question 1 is ‘yes,’ what does ‘intentional discrimination’ mean in this context?<br /></span><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong><br /></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">CONSERVATORSHIP</span></strong></span></div><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:100%"><strong></strong><br /></span><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong>Conservatorship of John L., S157151.</strong> May a proposed conservatee’s attorney, by making an unsworn statement to the court that the person did not wish to be present and did not object to the appointment of a conservator, waive the person’s right to be present at the hearing on a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, although the report of the “officer providing conservatorship investigation” appointed by the county states that the person did not want a conservator?<br /><br /><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">CONSTITUTIONAL</span></strong><br /><strong></strong><br /></span> <p><span style="font-size:100%"><strong>Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Bd., S155589. </strong></span><span style="font-size:100%">May a staff attorney for an administrative agency attorney serve as a prosecutor in one matter while simultaneously serving as an advisor to the agency as decision maker in an unrelated matter, without violating the due process rights of parties that appear before the agency?</span></p><p><span style="font-size:100%"><b><i>Society for Krishna Consciousness v. City of Los Angeles, S164272</i></b>.<span> </span>(1) Is Los Angeles International Airport a public forum under the Liberty of Speech Clause of the California Constitution? (2) If so, does the ordinance at issue violate the California Constitution?</span></p><p><span style="font-size:100%"><span style="font-weight:bold;color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">CONTRACTS</span></span></p><p><span style="font-size:100%"><b><i><span>Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Great American Ins. Co., S165113</span></i></b><span>.<span> </span>Must a contractor bringing a contract claim against a public agency based on the theory of breach of implied warranty prove intentional concealment of material facts?</span></span></p><p><span style="font-size:100%"><span style="font-weight:bold;color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">CORPORATIONS</span></span></p><p><span style="font-size:100%"><b><i><span>Azure Limited v. I-Flow Corp., S164884</span></i></b></span><span style="font-size:100%"><span>.<span> </span>Is the statutory immunity accorded a corporation that transfers escheated shares of stock to the state (Code Civ. Proc. § 1532, subd. (d)) absolute or conditional?</span></span></p><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0);font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span><span style="font-weight:bold;color:rgb(153, 0, 0);font-size:100%">DISCOVERY</span><span style="font-size:100%"><br /><br /></span><span style="font-size:100%"><b>Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court, S163335</b>.<span> </span>(1) Does the attorney-client privilege (Evid. Code, § 954) protect factual statements that outside counsel conveys to corporate counsel in a legal opinion letter?<span> </span>(2) Does Evidence Code section 915 prohibit a trial court from conducting an in camera review of a legal opinion letter to determine whether the attorney-client privilege protects facts stated in the letter?</span><span style="font-size:100%"><br /><br /><strong></strong><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">DISQUALIFICATION & RECUSAL</span><br /><br />In re Charlisse C., S152822.</strong> What standard should control disqualification of counsel from legal service agencies and public law firms in juvenile dependency proceedings due to successive representation of clients with potentially conflicting interests?</span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />Haraguchi v. Superior Court, No. S148207. </strong>(1) Was the trial court’s ruling on a motion for recusal alleging conflict of interest, because the prosecutor had written a novel allegedly based in part on the facts of this case, subject to independent review or reviewable only for an abuse of discretion? (2) Was recusal appropriate under either standard?<br /><br /></span><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0);font-size:100%"><strong>ELECTIONS </strong><br /></span><span style="font-size:100%"><br /><strong>Vargas v. City of Salinas, No. S140911. </strong>What is the proper standard for determining when a city has unlawfully expended public funds on improper partisan election campaigning? (See Stanson v. Mott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 206.)<br /><br /><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">EMPLOYMENT & LABOR</span></strong><br /><br /><strong>Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, S151615.</strong> (1) Does a worker’s assignment to the worker’s union of a cause of action for meal and rest period violations carry with it the worker’s right to sue in a representative capacity under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) or the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.)? (2) Does Business and Professions Code section 17203, as amended by Proposition 64, which provides that representative claims may be brought only if the injured claimant “complies with Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure,” require that private representative claims meet the procedural requirements applicable to class action lawsuits?<br /><br /></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong>Arias v. Superior Court, S155965.</strong> (1) Must an employee who is suing an employer for labor law violations on behalf of himself and others under the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17203) bring his representative claims as a class action? (2) Must an employee who is pursuing such claims under the Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code, § 2699) bring them as a class action?<br /><br /><b><span>City of San Jose v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3, S162647</span></b></span><span style="font-size:100%">.<span> </span>Does the Public Employment Relations Board have the exclusive initial jurisdiction to determine whether certain “essential” public employees covered by Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3500 3511) have the right to strike, or does that jurisdiction rest with the superior court?</span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><br /><strong>Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., No. S147552.</strong> May employees assert a cause of action for invasion of privacy when their employer installed a hidden surveillance camera in the office to investigate whether someone was using an office computer for improper purposes, only operated the camera after normal working hours, and did not actually capture any video of the employees who worked in the office? </span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong><strong></strong><br /><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><b><i><span>McCarther v. Pacific Telesis Group, S164692</span></i></b><span>.<span> </span>(1) Does Labor Code section 233, which mandates that employees be allowed to use a portion of “accrued and available sick leave” to care for sick family members, apply to employer plans in which employees do not periodically accrue a certain number of paid sick days but are paid for qualifying absences due to illness?<span> </span>(2) Does Labor Code section 234, which prohibits employers from disciplining employees for using sick leave to care for sick family members, prohibit an employer from disciplining an employee who takes such “kin care” leave if the employer would have the right to discipline the employee for taking time off for the employee’s own illness or injury?</span><br /></span><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist., S153964.</strong> In an employment discrimination action, is the one year statute of limitations for filing an administrative complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing set forth in Government Code section 12960 subject to equitable tolling while the employee pursues an internal administrative remedy, such as a complaint with the community college chancellor filed pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 5, section 59300 et seq.?<br /><br /><b>Reid v. Google, Inc., S158965</b>. (1) Should California law recognize the “stray remarks” doctrine, which permits the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment to disregard isolated discriminatory remarks or comments unrelated to the decision-making process as insufficient to establish discrimination? (2) Are evidentiary objections not expressly ruled on at the time of decision on a summary judgment motion preserved for appeal?<br /><br /><strong>Roby v. McKesson Corp., S149752.</strong> (1) In an action for employment discrimination and harassment by hostile work environment, does Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640 require that the claim for harassment be established entirely by reference to a supervisor’s acts that have no connection with matters of business and personnel management, or may such management-related acts be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances allegedly creating a hostile work environment? (2) May an appellate court determine the maximum constitutionally permissible award of punitive damages when it has reduced the accompanying award of compensatory damages, or should the court remand for a new determination of punitive damages in light of the reduced award of compensatory damages?<br /><br /></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span> </div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong>Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc., S161385.</strong> Does the forfeiture provision of a voluntary incentive compensation plan, which gives employees the option of using a portion of their earnings to purchase shares in the company’s stock below market price but provides that employees forfeit both the stock and the money used to purchase it if they resign or are terminated for cause within a two-year period, violate Labor Code sections 201 or 202? </span></div><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span> </div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />Smith v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., S150528.</strong> Does Labor Code section 4607, which authorizes the Board to award attorney fees to an applicant who successfully resists a proceeding instituted by his or her employer to terminate a prior award for medical treatment, authorize the Board to award attorney fees to an applicant whose employer has not instituted proceedings to terminate medical care but has refused to authorize medical treatment, thereby requiring the applicant to institute proceedings to obtain that treatment?<br /><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />Spielbauer v. County of Santa Clara, S150402.</strong> When a public employee invokes his or her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in a public employer’s investigation of the employee’s conduct, must the public employer offer immunity from any criminal use of the employee’s statements before it can dismiss the employee for refusing to answer questions in connection with the investigation?<br /><br /></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span> </div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong>State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court, S151705.</strong> Under the Whistleblower Protection Act (Gov. Code §8547 et seq.), may a state employee bring a civil action after suffering an adverse decision by the State Personnel Board without successfully seeking a writ of administrative mandate to set aside that decision? </span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><br /><strong></strong></span><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0);font-size:100%"><strong>ENVIRONMENTAL<br /><br /></strong></span><span style="font-weight:bold;font-size:100%"><span>Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors, S163680</span></span><span><span style="font-weight:bold">.</span><span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span> </span>What statute of limitations under Public Resources Code section 21167 applies after a public agency files a notice of determination stating that an entire project will not have a significant impact on the environment?<br /><br /></span><span style="font-size:100%"><b>Communities for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., S161190</b>. In determining whether a project requires the preparation of an environmental impact report under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.), is the maximum amount of emissions allowed a facility under an existing permit part of the baseline against which future environmental impacts should be assessed, even though (a) the facility’s current operations did not reach that level of emissions and (b) the level of emissions allowed by the permit had not been subjected to CEQA review?</span><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0);font-size:100%"><strong></strong> </span><span style="font-size:100%"><br /><br /><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong>Guzman v. County of Monterey, S157793.</strong> Does the California Safe Drinking Water Act (Health & Saf. Code, § 116270 et seq.) impose specific mandatory duties upon the County of Monterey within the meaning of Government Code section 815.6 and thus expose the county to monetary liability for the breach of a duty to review and respond to water quality monitoring reports submitted by water systems within its jurisdiction?<br /><br /><strong>Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood, S151402.</strong> Does an agreement between agencies that describes a proposal in detail but expressly withholds any commitment to a definite course of action and is conditioned upon compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) constitute “approval” of a “project” necessitating environmental impact review under the Act?<br /><br /><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">FAMILY LAW & DEPENDENCY<br /></span></strong><br /><strong>Guardianship of Ann S., No. S143723. </strong>Is Probate Code section 1516.5 constitutional if it permits the termination of parental rights without a present finding of parental unfitness?<br /><br /><strong>In re Charlotte D., No. S142028. </strong>Is Probate Code section 1516.5, which permits the termination of parental rights without an express finding of parental unfitness, unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to an unwed father who has demonstrated a full commitment to his parental responsibilities?<br /><br /></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong>In re Corrine W., S156898.</strong> Does Welfare and Institutions Code section 11460, subdivision (b), which requires that foster parents be paid for “food, clothing, shelter, daily supervision, school supplies, a child’s personal incidentals, [and] liability insurance with respect to a child,” require reimbursement of the costs of automobile liability insurance so that a teenaged foster child can drive?<br /><br /><b>In re Nolan W., S159524</b></span><span style="font-size:100%">. (1) Did the juvenile court have the authority to order the minor’s mother to participate in a substance abuse program as part of her reunification plan? (2) Did Welfare and Institutions Code section 213 authorize the juvenile court to hold the minor’s mother in contempt and incarcerate her for failing to comply with that component of the reunification plan?<br /><br /></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="color:rgb(102, 0, 0);font-size:100%"><strong>FOREIGN JUDGMENTS<br /><br /></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong>Manco Contracting Co. v. Bezdikian, S154076.</strong> This case presents the following issues: (1) Is a foreign money judgment final within the meaning of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (Code of Civ. Pro, § 1713 et seq.), even though an appeal of the foreign judgment is pending and the law of the foreign jurisdiction provides that a judgment is not final there until the appeal has been resolved? (2) What statute of limitations applies to an action to enforce a foreign judgment?<br /><br /></span><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0);font-size:100%"><strong>HEALTH & MEDICAL<br /><br /></strong></span><span style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0);font-size:100%"><strong>Mileikowsky v. West Hills Hospital & Medical Center, S156986.</strong> Does the presiding hearing officer in a medical peer review proceeding have the authority to terminate the hearing as a sanction for a party’s failure to cooperate in discovery, or must that decision be made by the hearing committee empowered to decide the case on the merits?</span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)"><br />IMMUNITY </span></strong><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)"><br /></span></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />Van Horn v. Watson, S152360.</strong> Does the immunity provided by Health and Safety Code section 1799.102 for any person who “renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency” apply to a person who removed someone from a wrecked car because she feared it would burst into flames?<br /><br /><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">INDEMNITY</span></strong><br /><br /><strong>Prince v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., S149344.</strong> Does the principle that there can be no indemnity without liability apply to claims for implied contractual indemnity as it does to claims for comparative equitable indemnity?<br /><br /><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">INSURANCE </span></strong><br /><br /><strong>Ameron Internat. Corp. v. Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania, S153852.</strong> Does a proceeding before the United States Department of the Interior Board of Contract Appeals constitute a “suit” such as to trigger insurance coverage under a commercial general liability policy?</span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />Delgado v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club, S155129.</strong> Petition for review after the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in a civil action. This case presents the following issue: When a liability policy covers injury arising from an “occurrence,” which is defined as an “accident,” does the insurer have a duty to defend an action for assault if the complaint alleges the insured was acting under an unreasonable and negligent belief that he was acting in self-defense?</span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />Fairbanks v. Superior Court, S157001.</strong> Is insurance a “good” or a “service” that is subject to the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750)?</span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />Sentry Select Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty, No. S145087. </strong>What is the appropriate test for determining whether an insured is "engaged in the business of renting or leasing motor vehicles without operators" under California Insurance Code section 11580.9(b)? </span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />State of California v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, S149988.</strong> (1) Does application of the pollution exclusion clause of the comprehensive general liability excess insurance policies at issue in this case turn on when waste material was discharged from the Stringfellow Acid Pits waste disposal site or when the waste was initially deposited into the site? (2) If pollution is caused by both uncovered intentional actions and covered accidents, does the insured have the burden at trial to prove that all of the damages it seeks to recover were caused by a covered event, or is there a duty to indemnify when two concurrent causes are responsible for an injury even if one of the causes is an uncovered act? </span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />21st Century Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, S154790.</strong> Should an insured’s attorney fees and costs incurred to obtain compensation from a third party tortfeasor be taken into account when applying the rule that an insurer cannot seek reimbursement from the insured unless the insured has been “made whole” by the recovery from the tortfeasor and other sources?<br /><br /><b>Village Northridge Homeowners Assn. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., S161008</b>. After settling a first party claim by accepting money from and executing a release of the insurer, may an insured sue the insurer for fraud in inducing the settlement and seek to avoid the release without returning the money the insurer paid?<br /></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><br /></span><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0);font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">PREEMPTION</span><br /></strong><br /></span><span style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0);font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span><span style="font-size:100%"><strong>WFS Financial, Inc. v. Superior Court, No. S145304.</strong> Are the provisions of the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act (Civ. Code, § 2981 et seq.) that require a creditor to include certain disclosures in a notice of intent to dispose of a vehicle after it has been repossessed and that condition the creditor’s right to seek a deficiency judgment on compliance with these requirements (Civ. Code, § 2983.2), preempted by the federal Home Owners’ Loan Act (12 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq.) when the creditor is a federally chartered savings institution?<br /><br /></span><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0);font-size:100%"><strong>PROPERTY </strong><br /></span><span style="font-size:100%"><br /><strong>Episcopal Church Cases, S155094.</strong> (1) Should the “principle of government” approach, also known as the “highest church judicatory” approach, be used to resolve disputes between a local congregation and a national church or regional diocese over ownership of church property, or should these disputes be resolved using a “neutral principles analysis”? (2) Was the complaint properly subject to a motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16? (3) What role does Corporations Code section 9142 play in the analysis and resolution of church property disputes? </span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><br /><strong></strong><b>Murphy v. Burch, S159489</b>. This case presents issues concerning the application of the common law doctrine of easement by necessity, including the question whether, in view of the federal government’s power of eminent domain, the common law doctrine of easement by necessity applies to land originally owned by and subsequently conveyed by the federal government.<br /></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />Patel v. Liebermensch, S156797.</strong> Are the time and manner of payment essential terms of a real estate purchase option contract such that their absence negates formation of a contract?<br /><br /><strong></strong></span></div><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:100%"><b>Ste. Marie v. Riverside County Regional Park & Open-Space Dist., S159319</b>. Did the lower courts err in this case by concluding that property acquired by the District for recreational purposes was “actually dedicated” by operation of law, pursuant to Public Resources Code section 5565, and that Public Resources Code section 5540 required the District to obtain the consent of a majority of voters in the District in order to validly convey the property to a local community college district?<strong></strong><br /><br /></span><span style="font-weight:bold;color:rgb(153, 0, 0);font-family:times new roman;font-size:100%">PUNITIVE DAMAGES</span><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:100%"><br /><br /><b><span>B</span><span>uell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., S163102</span></b></span><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:100%">.<span> </span><span> </span>(1) What procedural protections are required by <i>Philip Morris USA v. Williams</i> (2007) 549 U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 1057, which held that due process requires that a jury not award punitive damages to punish for harm to third parties; and under what circumstances can those constitutional rights be deemed forfeited?<span> </span>(2) Are punitive damages prohibited in product liability cases where the manufacturer’s design conforms to governmental safety standards and industry standards and custom, and there is a “genuine debate” about what the law requires?<span> </span>(2) Is the amount of the punitive damage award in this case unconstitutionally excessive and arbitrary?<span> </span><span>The court ordered briefing deferred pending the decision of the United States Supreme Court in </span></span><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:100%"><i><span>Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams</span></i></span><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:100%">, No. 07-1216, cert. granted June 9, 2008, __ U.S. __ [2008 WL 791949]</span><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:100%">, <span>or further order of this court.</span></span><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:100%"><br /><br /><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">RES JUDICATA & COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL</span><br /><br />Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., S162029.</strong> Did the doctrine of res judicata bar plaintiff’s claim for noneconomic damages in a wrongful death action after her husband died, because she had dismissed with prejudice a claim for loss of consortium while he was alive?<br /><br /></span><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span> </div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong>Hernandez v. City of Pomona, S149499.</strong> (1) Does an action against a police officer for injury resulting from the use of deadly force implicate a single primary right, such that a final judgment in favor of the police officer on a civil rights claim in federal court is res judicata in a subsequent negligence action in state court based on the same circumstances and injury? (2) Where a federal court renders a final judgment that a police officer’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and the court subsequently declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over a state law negligence claim, does the rule against splitting a cause of action bar a subsequent state court action on the negligence claim? (3) Does collateral estoppel bar a subsequent negligence claim based on “pre-seizure” conduct by the police officer that gave rise to the circumstances in which the officer was required to use deadly force?<br /><br /><b><span>Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., S162570</span></b></span><span style="font-size:100%">. Should issue-preclusive effect be given to a federal agency’s investigative findings, when the subsequent administrative process provides the complainant the option of a formal adjudicatory hearing to determine the contested issues de novo, as well as subsequent judicial review of that determination, but the complainant elects not to invoke his right to that additional process?</span><span style="font-size:100%"><br /><br /><strong><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0)">STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS & REPOSE</span></strong><br /><br /><strong>Hebrew Academy of San Francisco v. Goldman, No. S134873. </strong>When a publication containing an allegedly defamatory statement is available to the public but has a very limited distribution, does the statute of limitations on a defamation cause of action begin to run at the time of the first general distribution (the "single publication rule") or when the allegedly defamatory statement is or reasonably should have been discovered (the "discovery rule")? </span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />McCann v. Foster Wheeler, S162435.</strong> Does Oklahoma’s statute of repose bar a product liability action by a 30-year California resident against a boiler manufacturer arising out of the installation of a boiler in Oklahoma?<br /><br /><b>Stockton Citizens for Sensible Planning v. City of Stockton, S159690</b></span><span style="font-size:100%">. Was plaintiffs’ challenge to the approval of a Wal-Mart Supercenter project filed within the applicable statute of limitations on the theory that the approval was invalid and thus did not trigger the running of the limitations period?<br /><br /></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0);font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0);font-size:100%"><strong>TAXATION AND FEES</strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />Bonander v. Town of Tiburon, S151370. </strong>Are the validation statutes (Code Civ. Proc., § 860 et seq.) the exclusive remedy available for challenging a special assessment levied under Streets and Highways Code section 10601 based on allegations that individual property owners are not receiving a special or proportionate benefit within the meaning of Proposition 218 (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 4, subd. (a))?</span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />California Farm Bureau Federation v. California State Water Resources Control Bd., S150518.</strong> (1) Does Water Code section 1525, which was amended by the Legislature by majority vote in 2003 to impose annual fees on the persons and entities holding permits and licenses issued by the State Water Resources Control Board, impose an invalid tax or a lawful regulatory fee? (2) If section 1525 is valid, may the Water Resources Control Board permissibly collect a fee levied on an entity which has sovereign immunity from a person or entity who has a contract with the immune sovereign? (3) If the statutory scheme is valid, but the regulations implementing it are invalid, did the Court of Appeal err in limiting refunds to only those persons and entities filing petitions for reconsideration before the Water Resources Control Board? </span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong><br />Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles, S158007.</strong> (1) Is the vesting of a life estate a “change in ownership” under Revenue and Taxation Code section 60 that triggers reassessment? (2) Was the taxpayer, under these circumstances, required to exhaust her administrative remedies by pursuing her claim with the Assessment Appeals Board before filing suit? (3) Was the taxpayer’s declaratory relief action barred by the prohibition in Revenue and Taxation Code section 4807 on actions to “prevent or enjoin the collection of property taxes”?<br /><br /></span><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0);font-size:100%"><strong>TORTS </strong><br /></span><span style="font-size:100%"><br /><strong>Christoff v. Nestlé USA, Inc., S155242. </strong>(1) Does the single publication rule (see Civ. Code, § 3425.3) apply to an action under Civil Code section 3344 for appropriation of likeness? (2) Is the use of a likeness on product labels a “publication” for purposes of the single publication rule? (3) Under what circumstances, if any, would the continuing use of a likeness on product labels and in advertisements marketing a product constitute “republication” and give rise to a new cause of action? (4) Does the discovery rule apply in an action for appropriation of likeness?</span></div><div style="font-family:times new roman"><span style="font-size:100%"><strong></strong></span></div><div><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:100%"><strong><br />Conroy v. Regents of University of California, S153002.</strong> Could the surviving spouse of a person who donated his body for medical research sue in contract or in tort based on claim the university failed to keep track of her husband’s body, failed to contact her before disposing of the remains, and allegedly mishandled or treated the remains improperly or in a manner not permitted by the donative contract?<br /><br /></span><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0);font-family:times new roman;font-size:100%"><strong>UNFAIR COMPETITION</strong><br /></span><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:100%"><br /><strong>In re Tobacco II Cases, No. S147345.</strong> (1) In order to bring a class action under Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), as amended by Proposition 64 (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004)), must every member of the proposed class have suffered “injury in fact,” or is it sufficient that the class representative comply with that requirement? (2) In a class action based on a manufacturer’s alleged misrepresentation of a product, must every member of the class have actually relied on the manufacturer’s representations?<br /><br /></span><span style="color:rgb(153, 0, 0);font-weight:bold;font-family:times new roman;font-size:100%">VERDICTS</span><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:100%"><br /><br /><b><span>Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., S163430</span></b></span><span style="font-family:times new roman;font-size:100%">.<span> </span>(1) Does failure to object to incomplete polling before the jury is discharged waive the argument that the polling was incomplete and the verdict invalid?<span> </span>(2) For purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 618, which provides that a jury verdict “is complete and the jury discharged from the case” if “no disagreement is expressed” upon polling the jurors, is a juror’s silence during polling, if the court failed to poll the juror, an “expressed” disagreement with the verdict?</span><br /></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-908935810170839155.post-13091837950221155882006-04-29T19:25:00.000-07:002011-01-03T00:47:13.776-08:00Last Updated March 3, 2007<a href="http://photos1.blogger.com/blogger/925/2870/1600/COLOR%20JUNE%202006.1.jpg"><img style="float:left;margin:0px 10px 10px 0px" alt="" src="http://photos1.blogger.com/blogger/925/2870/200/COLOR%20JUNE%202006.0.jpg" border="0"></a><br /><strong></strong><span style="color:#990000"></span><span style="color:#990000"></span><em>This website lists and describes all currently pending civil cases in which the California Supreme Court has granted review, excluding those on grant and hold. The list is updated regularly by California appeals attorney Martin N. Buchanan, a partner at <a href="http://www.nfblawyers.com">Niddrie, Fish & Buchanan</a> in San Diego, California. The case descriptions come from the weekly News Release issued by the Public Information Office of the Administrative Office of the Courts. As stated in the News Release, the statement of issues does not necessarily reflect the view of the court, or define the specific issues that will be addressed by the court.</em><br /><strong></strong><br /><strong></strong><br /><strong></strong><br /><strong>ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, No. S143087</span><br />Can the exception to the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) for actions "brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public" (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.17, subd. (b)) apply to a complaint that includes any claim for personal relief?<br /><br /><strong>APPEALS</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., No. S137238</span><br />Did the Statement of Decision and Minute Order dated January 2, 2003 [denying class certification], trigger the 60-day period within which to notice an appeal under California Rules of Court, rule 2(a)(1)?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Oakland Raiders v. National Football League, No. S132814</span><br />If the trial court fails to specify its reasons for granting a new trial (see Code Civ. Proc., section 657), is the trial court's order granting a new trial reviewed on appeal under the abuse of discretion standard or is the order subject to independent review? Supplemental briefing requested on: (1) Should the court reconsider Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, to the extent that it bars an appellate court from remanding a case to a trial court to enable the trial court to file a statement of reasons in support of its order granting a new trial? (2) Should the court reconsider Treber v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 128, to the extent that it bars an appellate court from issuing a writ of mandate to compel a trial court to file a statement of reasons in support of its order granting a new trial?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles, No. S143929</span><br />Does the "prison delivery" rule apply to the filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case, and thus make timely a notice of appeal deposited in the prison legal mail system before the expiration of the jurisdictional deadline but not received by the trial court until after that deadline has passed?<br /><br /><strong>ARBITRATION, MEDIATION & SETTLEMENT</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Berglund v. Arthroscopic & Laser Surgery Center of San Diego, No. S144813</span><br /><span style="color:#000000">(1) When an arbitrator issues a discovery order to a third party who is not bound by the arbitration agreement, may that third party seek judicial review of its objections to discovery? (2) If so, what is the scope of judicial review of such an order? </span><span style="color:#000000"><br /></span><span style="color:#000000"><br /></span><span style="color:#990000">Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., No. S147767. </span><span style="color:#000000">May the parties to a commercial arbitration agreement contractually expand the jurisdiction of the trial court to permit review of an arbitration award for legal error?</span><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Federici v. Gursey Schneider & Co., S147905.</span> Was an arbitration agreement between an accounting firm and its client unconscionable and unenforceable when it required arbitration of any fee dispute, required that any malpractice claims be asserted in such arbitration as a potential offset of fees owed, provided that the client could not file a court action for malpractice unless all fees were offset by malpractice damages, and made the arbitration findings res judicata in any court action only if favorable to the accounting firm?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd., No. S148568.</span> Was an arbitration provision in a franchise agreement that prohibited the arbitrator from modifying any material terms of the agreement an absolute limitation, or did it permit application of equitable or legal defenses, such as excusing the franchisee’s failure to give the franchisor the required notice of a breach of the agreement and an opportunity to cure it, on the ground the breach could not have been cured and giving notice would have been an idle act?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Simmons v. Ghaderi, No. S147848.</span> In an action to determine whether a valid oral settlement agreement was formed during mediation, was one party estopped to claim confidentiality for the mediation proceedings (Evid. Code, §§ 1115-1124) because she had voluntarily declared the facts to be true, stipulated that she did not dispute them, submitted evidence of them, and litigated their effect for more than a year?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Wagner Construction v. Pacific Mechanical Corp., No. S136255</span><br />When a party seeks to compel arbitration, can the trial court determine whether a particular claim is barred by a statute of limitations as part of determining whether the party waived the right to arbitrate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (a), or is the application of a statute of limitations always a matter to be resolved by the arbitrator?<br /><br /><strong>ATTORNEY FEES</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Adoption of Joshua S., No. S138169</span><br />Was the plaintiff in a civil action that was brought to confirm the validity of a so-called second parent adoption (see Sharon S. v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 417) entitled to attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 for enforcing an important right affecting the public interest, when the plaintiff had a strong and significant, but non-pecuniary, individual private interest in pursuing the litigation?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California, S143999</span><br /><span style="color:#000000">Is a prevailing plaintiff who is awarded attorney’s fees under the private attorney general statute (Civ. Code, section 1021.5) entitled to recover expert witness fees?</span><br /><span style="color:#990000"></span><br /><span style="color:#990000">Vasquez v. State of California, No. S143710</span><br />Does that rule that, in order to receive attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the plaintiff must first reasonably attempt to settle the matter short of litigation, apply to this case? (See <em>Graham v. DaimerChrysler Corp.</em> (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 557; <em>Grimsley v. Board of Supervisors </em>(1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 960, 966-967.)<br /><br /><strong>CIVIL COMMITMENT</strong><br /><strong></strong><br /><span style="color:#990000">In re Lemanual C. No. S144515</span><br />Was petitioner's civil commitment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800 unconstitutional because the petition did not allege, and the trial court did not specifically find, that there was "a serious and well-founded risk" that petitioner would reoffend if not committed?<br /><br /><strong>CIVIL RIGHTS</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, No. S136154</span><br />When a business establishment indicates that it charges men a higher price for admission than it charges women, must a male patron who was charged the higher rate have requested to be admitted at the lower women’s rate in order to state a cause of action for unlawful discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51) or the Gender Tax Repeal Act (Civ. Code, § 51.6)?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Manta Management Corp. v. City of San Bernardino, No. S144492<br /></span>Can a municipality be held liable for damages under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S. C. section 1983) for obtaining a preliminary injunciton to enforce an ordinance that is later found to be invalid as an unconstitutional impingement on the First Amendment right to freedom of speech?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Yount v. City of Sacramento, No. S139762</span><br />Must a defendant who entered a plea of no contest to a charge of obstructing police officers in the course of their duties (Pen. Code, section 148) and who had engaged in a continuous course of conduct involving multiple acts of obstruction, any one of which would have supported the conviction, have the conviction invalidated in order to bring a civil rights claim (42 U.S.C. section 1983) alleging the use of excessive force by the officers in the course of taking him into custody? (See Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477.)<br /><br /><strong>CLASS ACTIONS</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Fireside Bank v. Superior Court (Gonzalez), No. S139171</span><br />Can a trial court ever depart from the preferred practice of deciding whether to certify a class action before adjudicating any class claims on the merits, or is the rule against such "one-way intervention" in class actions a firm prohibition applicable in all circumstances?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Gentry v. Superior Court, No. S141502</span><br />This case presents issues regarding the enforceability of an arbitration provision that prohibits employee class actions in litigation concerning alleged violations of California's wage and hour laws.<br /><br /><strong>CONSTITUTIONAL </strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Balboa Island Village Inn v. Lemen, No. S127904</span><br />When a trial court has found that a defendant in a defamation action has made repeated untruthful defamatory statements against the plaintiff and that pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief in the event of repeated statements in the future, may the trial court issue an injunction prohibiting defendant from continuing to make the same defamatory statements to third parties or does such an injunction constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech? (See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121.)<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">California Statewide Communities Development v. All Persons Interested, No. S124195</span><br />Can tax-exempt bond financing be provided to sectarian schools that discriminate on religious grounds in admission and require instruction in a particular faith so long as the financed facilities will not be used for any sectarian purpose, or is the provision of such financing to such entities nonetheless barred by article XVI, section 5, of the California Constitution or the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution? Supplemental briefing requested on the following issue: Would excluding a school from entitlement to bond funding based on its inclusion of a religious viewpoint in its teaching of secular subjects violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantee? (See Good News Club v. Milford Central School (2001) 533 U.S. 98; Locke v. Davey (2004) 540 U.S. 712.)<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Hernandez v. City of Hanford, No. S143287</span><br /><span style="color:#000000">Did an amendment to a commercial zoning ordinance prohibiting a small store from selling furniture, while allowing large "box-stores" in the same commercial zone to sell furniture in a limited part of the store, constitute a violation of the small store retainer's equal protection rights? Did the Court of Appeal accord sufficient deference to legislative findings in ruling that the small store retailer's equal protection rights were violated?</span><br /><br /><p><span style="color:#990000">In re Marriage Cases, No. S147999.</span> Does California’s statutory ban on marriage between two persons of the same sex violate the California Constitution by denying equal protection of the laws on the basis of sexual orientation or sex, by infringing on the fundamental right to marry, or by denying the right to privacy and freedom of expression?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Jacob B. v. County of Shasta, No. S142496</span><br />Does the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), bar a cause of action under the state Constitution for invasion of privacy?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">North Coast Women's Care Medical Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, No. S142892</span><br />Does a physician have a constitutional right to refuse on religious grounds to perform a medical procedure for a patient because of the patient’s sexual orientation, or do the provisions of the Unruh Act (Civ. Code, § 51) preclude such discrimination in the provision of services notwithstanding the physician’s religious beliefs?<br /><br /><strong>CONTRACTS </strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">City of Stockton v. Superior Court, No. S139237</span><br />Must a claim be presented under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, section 810 et seq.) in order to bring an action against a public entity for breach of contract?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., No. S141541</span><br />Did a contract under which a subcontractor agreed "to defend any suit or action" against a developer "founded upon" any claim "growing out of the execution of the work" require the subcontractor to provide a defense to a suit against the developer even if the subcontractor was not negligent?<br /><br /><strong>CORPORATIONS</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Grosset v. Wennas, No. S139285</span><br />(1) Does the question of standing to bring a shareholder's derivative action based on share ownership involve the "internal affairs" of a corporation and thus invoke the internal affairs doctrine, under which matters regulating the internal affairs of a corporation are governed by the law of the state of incorporation, here the state of Delaware? (2) If not, did plaintiff retain standing under California law to prosecute a shareholder's derivative action even though he lost his shares in the corporation while the action was pending or does California, like Delaware, require stock ownership throughout the litigation?<br /><br /><strong>DISCOVERY & PUBLIC RECORDS</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Catholic Mutual Relief Society v. Superior Court, No. S134545</span><br />Does Code of Civil Procedure section 2017 permit the discovery of information about the existence and extent of reinsurance coverage and the financial condition of a reinsurer for a defendant's insurer?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training v. Superior Court, No. S134072<br /></span>Is the information sought in this case, including the names and certain employment information pertaining to individual peace officers throughout the state, information obtained from confidential "personnel records" under Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, and thus exempt from disclosure under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, section 6250 et seq.) pursuant to Government Code section 6254, subdivision (k)?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">International Federation of Professional Engineers v. Superior Court, No. S134253</span><br />(1) Are the names and salaries of public employees who earn more than $100,000 per year exempt from disclosure under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, section 6250 et seq.) pursuant to Government Code section 6254, subdivision (c)? (2) Is salary information about individually identified peace officers within the definition of confidential "personnel records" under Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, and thus exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act pursuant to section 6254, subdivision (k)?<br /><br /><strong>DISQUALIFICATION & RECUSAL </strong><br /><strong></strong><br /><span style="color:#990000">Rico v. Mitsubishi Corp., No. S123808<br /></span>Did the trial court properly disqualify plaintiffs' attorneys and plaintiffs' expert witnesses as a sanction when an attorney representing one of the plaintiffs, after inadvertently receiving a document prepared by defense counsel that included confidential work product, extensively reviewed the document with the attorneys representing other plaintiffs and with plaintiffs' expert witnesses? </p><p><span style="color:#990000">Haraguchi v. Superior Court, No. S148207.</span> (1) Was the trial court’s ruling on a motion for recusal alleging conflict of interest, because the prosecutor had written a novel allegedly based in part on the facts of this case, subject to independent review or reviewable only for an abuse of discretion? (2) Was recusal appropriate under either standard?</p><p><span style="color:#990000">Hollywood v. Superior Court, No. S147954.</span> (1) Was the trial court’s ruling on a motion for recusal alleging conflict of interest, because the prosecutor had cooperated with filmmakers planning a motion picture based on this case, subject to independent review or reviewable only for an abuse of discretion? (2) Was recusal appropriate under either standard? (3) If recusal was required, was it error not to recuse the entire district attorney’s office?<br /><br /><strong>ELECTIONS</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Vargas v. City of Salinas, No. S140911<br /></span>What is the proper standard for determining when a city has unlawfully expended public funds on improper partisan election campaigning? (See Stanson v. Mott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 206.)<br /><br /><strong>EMPLOYMENT & LABOR</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Atwater Elementary School District v. Office of Administrative Hearings, No. S124188<br /></span>Can a school district ever suspend or dismiss a credentialed teacher based on matters occurring more than four years before issuance of the notice of intention to impose such discipline (for example, under an equitable tolling or delayed discovery theory), or does Education Code section 44944, subdivision (a), absolutely ban reliance on such evidence? (Cf. Ed. Code, section 44242.7, subd. (a).) </p><p><span style="color:#990000">Brodie v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., No. S146979 & Welcher v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., No. S147030.</span> Both of these cases present the following issues: (1) Did the repeal of Labor Code section 4750 and the enactment of new apportionment statutes (Stats. 2004, ch. 34) change the law of apportionment of permanent disability indemnity as determined by this court in Fuentes v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 1? (2) If so, how is permanent disability indemnity to be apportioned between injuries?</p><p><span style="color:#990000">Consulting Engineers & Land Surveyors in California, Inc. v. Professional Engineers in California Government, No. S145341.</span> Did a collective bargaining agreement between the state and a union of state engineers, which required the state to use state engineers on public works projects before using private engineers to “ensure that [state] employees have preference over contract employees,” violate article XXII of the state Constitution, added by Proposition 35 (General Elec. (Nov. 7, 2000)), which provides that state entities “shall be allowed” to contract with private architectural and engineering firms for services on public works and that nothing in the Constitution shall be construed to “limit, restrict or prohibit” them from doing so?</p><p><span style="color:#990000">Edwards v. Arthur Anderson LLP, No. S147190. </span><span style="color:#000000">(1) To what extent does Business and Professions Code section 16600 prohibit employee noncompetition agreements? (2) Does a contract provision releasing “any and all” claims encompass nonwaivable statutory protections, such as the employee indemnity protection of Labor Code section 2802?</span></p><p><span style="color:#990000">Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, No. S144753</span><br />Under California law, may Fashion Valley maintain and enforce against the Union its Rule 5.6.2, which allows individuals and organizations to engage in expressive activities on its premises with a permit if they agree to abide by its rules and regulations that prohibit urging consumers to boycott any of the mall's tenants?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Gattuso v. Harte Hanks Shoppers, No. S139555<br /></span>May an employer comply with its duty under Labor Code section 2802 to indemnify its employees for expenses they necessarily incur in the discharge of their duties by paying the employees increased wages or commissions instead of reimbursing them for their actual expenses?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Green v. State of California, No. S137770<br /></span>In order to establish a prima facie case under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, section 12900 et seq.) for discrimination in employment based on disability, does the plaintiff bear the burden of proving that he or she is capable of performing the essential duties of the job or does the employer have the burden of proving that the plaintiff was not capable of performing those duties? </p><p><span style="color:#990000">Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., No. S147552.</span> May employees assert a cause of action for invasion of privacy when their employer installed a hidden surveillance camera in the office to investigate whether someone was using an office computer for improper purposes, only operated the camera after normal working hours, and did not actually capture any video of the employees who worked in the office?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Lonicki v. Sutter Health Central, No. S130839</span><br />(1) Under the provisions of the Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (Gov. Code, section 12945.2) that grant an employee the right to a leave of absence when the employee has a serious health condition that makes the employee "unable to perform the functions of the position of that employee," is an employee entitled to a leave of absence where the employee's serious health condition prevents him or her from working for a specific employer, but the employee is able to perform a similar job for a different employer? (2) Did defendant's failure to invoke the statutory procedure for contesting the medical certificate presented by plaintiff preclude it from later contesting the validity of that certificate?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Miklosky v. U.C. Regents, No. S139133<br /></span>Does the requirement of the Whistleblower Protection Act (Gov. Code, §§ 8547-8547.12) that an employee of the University of California have "filed a complaint with the [designated] university officer" and that the university have "failed to reach a decision regarding that complaint within [specified] time limits" before an action for damages can be brought (§ 8547.10, subd. (c)) merely require the exhaustion of the internal remedy as a condition of bringing the action, or does it bar an action for damages if the university timely renders any decision on the complaint?</p><p><span style="color:#990000">Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, No. S140308<br /></span>(1) Is a claim under Labor Code section 226.7 for the required payment of "one additional hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of compensation" for each day that an employer fails to provide mandatory meal or rest periods to an employee (see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, section 11010, subds. (11)(D), 12(B)) governed by the three-year statute of limitations for a claim for compensation (Code Civ. Proc., section 338) or the one-year statute of limitations for a claim for payment of a penalty (Code Civ. Proc., section 340)? (2) When an employee obtains an award on such a wage claim in administrative proceedings and the employer seeks de novo review in superior court, can the employee pursue additional wage claims not presented in the administrative proceedings?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Prachasaisoradej v. Ralphs Grocery, No. S128576</span><br />Does an employee bonus plan based on a profit figure that is reduced by a store's expenses, including the cost of workers compensation insurance and cash and inventory losses, violate (a) Business and Professions Code section 17200, (b) Labor Code sections 221, 400 through 410, or 3751, or (c) California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 11070?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Ross v. Ragingwire Telecommunications, No. S138130</span><br />When a person who is authorized to use marijuana for medical purposes under the California Compassionate Use Act (Health & Saf. Code, section 11362.5) is discharged from employment on the basis of his or her off-duty use of marijuana, does the employee have either a claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, section 12900 et seq.) for unlawful discrimination in employment on the basis of disability or a common law tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy? </p><p><span style="color:#990000">State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., S149257. </span>May an employer who does not timely act on an injured worker’s medical treatment request under the utilization review process set forth in Labor Code section 4610 nevertheless obtain review of the treatment request under the more general dispute resolution procedures set forth in Labor Code section 4062?<br /><br /><strong>ENVIRONMENTAL</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection, No. S143689</span><br />Did the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection properly interpret and apply the Z'berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973 (Pub. Resources Code, section 4511 et seq.) and the Forest Practice Rules (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, section 895 et seq.) in reviewing three timber harvesting plans in Tuolumne County?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Environmental Protection Info. Center v. Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection, No. S140547<br /></span>This case presents issues relating to environmental review of the master plan for timber harvesting related to the Headwaters Forest Project.<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Muzzy Ranch v. Solano County Airport Land Use Commission, No. S131484<br /></span>Did the adoption of an airport land use compatibility plan for an area near an air force base constitute a "project" within the meaning of the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, section 21000, et seq.) where the plan recommended maintenance of the status quo under the county's existing general plan and prohibited any change of zoning that would allow more dwelling units than were allowed under current zoning?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Regional Council of Rural Counties v. State of California, No. S138974<br />(Related Case: Laub v. Schwarzenegger, No. S138975)<br /></span>Did the final programmatic environmental impact report for the multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional CALFED Bay-Delta Program adequately address alternatives to diverting Bay-Delta water to southern California and the potential environmental impacts of diverting water to be purchased from as yet unidentified sources?<br /><br /><strong>EVIDENCE</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Lockheed Litigation Cases, No. S132167</span><br />Does Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b), permit a trial court to review the evidence an expert relied upon in reaching his or her conclusions in order to determine whether that evidence provides a reasonable basis for the expert's opinion?<br /><br /><strong>FAMILY LAW</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Guardianship of Ann S., No. S143723</span><br />Is Probate Code section 1516.5 constitutional if it permits the termination of parental rights without a present finding of parental unfitness?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">In re Charlotte D., No. S142028</span><br />Is Probate Code section 1516.5, which permits the termination of parental rights without an express finding of parental unfitness, unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to an unwed father who has demonstrated a full commitment to his parental responsibilities?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">In re Joshua S., No. S137583<br /></span>Does state or federal law prohibit the payment of Aid for Families with Dependent Children-Foster Care (AFDC-FC) benefits on behalf of dependent children placed in long-term foster care outside the United States?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Elkins v. Superior Court, No. S139073</span><br />Are Contra Costa County Superior Court Local Rule 12.5(b)(3) and the trial scheduling order in the present case, which limited, among other matters, the form of testimony and the presentation of evidence in this family law proceeding, consistent with constitutional principles and with statutes governing trial court procedures and the adoption of local court rules? </p><p><span style="color:#990000">Tonya M. v. Superior Court, S149248.</span> When determining at the “six-month review hearing” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e)) whether there is a “substantial probability” that a child under the age of three years, who had been removed from parental custody, will be returned to parental custody “within six months,” should the trial court (a) look to the six months following the date of the hearing, or (b) consider only the time remaining until the date of the previously-scheduled twelve-month review hearing, regardless of when the six-month review hearing actually is held?<br /><br /><strong>IMMUNITY </strong><br /><strong><br /></strong><span style="color:#990000">City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare, No. S143326</span><br /><span style="color:#000000">Does Government Code section 860.2 accord a county immunity for its allegedly improper calculation of property taxes and improper distribution of tax revenue owed to local taxing entities?</span><br /><span style="color:#990000"></span><br /><span style="color:#990000">Perez-Torres v. State of California, No. S137346<br /></span>Does Government Code section 845.8 immunize the State of California and individual parole agents from potential liability for the mistaken arrest and detention of an individual who was not on parole but, because he was mistaken for another person, was incarcerated for 25 days for having violated parole?<br /><br /><strong>INSURANCE </strong><br /><strong><br /></strong><span style="color:#990000">Sentry Select Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty, No. S145087</span><br />What is the appropriate test for determining whether an insured is "engaged in the business of renting or leasing motor vehicles without operators" under California Insurance Code section 11580.9(b)?<br /><br /><strong>INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech, No. S129463<br /></span>When an inventor or researcher entrusts a new idea or discovery to another under an arrangement providing for the other party to develop, patent, and commercially exploit the idea or discovery in return for royalties to be paid to the inventor or researcher, does a fiduciary relationship arise between the two parties, a breach of which may support tort, and in an appropriate case punitive, damages, or should the arrangement be treated like an ordinary contractual agreement, a breach of which supports only contract and not punitive damages?</p><p><strong>LICENSING</strong> </p><p><span style="color:#990000">Marathon Entertainment, Inc. v. Blasi, No. S145428.</span> (1) Are the licensing requirements of the Talent Agencies Act (Lab. Code § 1700 et seq.) applicable to personal business managers as well as talent agents? (2) Is the doctrine of severability of contracts applicable to violations of the Act, or does any act of unlicensed procurement of entertainment employment for an actor by an unlicensed personal business manager in violation of the Act void a contract for personal management services in its entirety?<br /><br /><strong>PREEMPTION<br /></strong><br /><span style="color:#990000">Action Apartment Association v. City of Santa Monica, No. S129448</span><br />Is a local ordinance prohibiting a landlord from maliciously taking action to terminate a tenancy "based upon facts which the landlord has no reasonable cause to believe to be true or upon a legal theory which is untenable under the facts known to the landlord" preempted by the statewide litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), because the ordinance applies to communicative acts?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Farm Raised Salmon Cases, No. S147171.</span> Does the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) impliedly preempt plaintiffs’ state law claims against defendants for deceptive marketing of food products by failing to disclose that farmed salmon sold in their stores contains artificial coloring?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">O’Connell v. City of Stockton, No. S135160<br /></span>(1) Does California state law preempt provisions of the City of Stockton Municipal Code pertaining to "Seizure and Forfeiture of Nuisance Vehicles"? (2) Do the Stockton municipal code provisions allowing the commencement of vehicle forfeiture proceedings "as soon as practicable but in any case within one year" satisfy the state and federal constitutional requirements of procedural due process? (3) Do the municipal code provisions allocating proceeds of vehicle forfeitures to the offices of the San Joaquin County District Attorney and the Stockton City Attorney violate state or federal constitutional guarantees of substantive or procedural due process?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Tobacco Cases II, No. S129522<br /></span>Does the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (15 U.S.C. section 1331 et seq.) preempt claims under the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, section 17200 et seq.) for advertising that allegedly targeted minors?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Viva International v. Adidas Promotional Retailer, No. S140064<br /></span>Does the doctrine of conflict preemption preclude California from prohibiting importation and trade of wildlife that have been delisted under the federal Endangered Species Act and thus are not currently regulated by federal law?</p><p><span style="color:#990000">WFS Financial, Inc. v. Superior Court, No. S145304.</span> Are the provisions of the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act (Civ. Code, § 2981 et seq.) that require a creditor to include certain disclosures in a notice of intent to dispose of a vehicle after it has been repossessed and that condition the creditor’s right to seek a deficiency judgment on compliance with these requirements (Civ. Code, § 2983.2), preempted by the federal Home Owners’ Loan Act (12 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq.) when the creditor is a federally chartered savings institution?<br /><br /><strong>PROPERTY</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez, No. S145571.</span> (1) Does appointment of a receiver for a substandard building under Health and Safety Code section 17980.7, subdivision (c), require service of an “order or notice to repair or abate” on the property owner as detailed in section 17980.6? (2) Is substantial compliance with the requirement of first serving a section 17980.6 order or notice to repair or abate sufficient to permit the appointment of a receiver? (3) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in approving the receiver’s recommendation to demolish the residence at issue in this case where the owner objected and there was ample equity in the property to pay an independent contractor to correct all code violations?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Mayer v. L&B Real Estate, No. S142211</span><br />Was plaintiffs' quiet title action barred by Revenue and Taxations Code section 3725 because it was not brought within one year of the sale of the property at a tax sale?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Metropolitan Water District v. Campus Crusade for Christ, No. S141148</span><br />This case presents issues concerning the burden of proof and the relative roles of the judge and the jury in eminent domain actions.<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Silicon Valley Taxpayers Association v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority, No. S136468</span><br />(1) In a legal action contesting validity of an assessment under Cal. Constitution article XIIID, what standard of review should apply in reviewing agency determination that properties on which assessment is to be imposed will "receive a special benefit over & above benefits conferred on public at large & the amount of any contested assessment is proportional to & no greater than benefits conferred on the property(s)," as required by the constitutional provision? (art. XIII D(4)(f).) (2) Can the benefit that future purchases of unidentified open space will confer upon everyone who lives or works in the assessment district be characterized as a "special benefit" to each parcel in district within the meaning of art. XIIID? (3) Under art. XIIID, may the agency impose an identitical assessment on all similar district properties (e.g, all single-family residences) or must it calculate benefit/cost to each individual parcel?</p><p><strong>PUBLIC WORKS</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Professional Engineers in California Government v. Morales, No. S139917<br /></span>Did Proposition 35 (General Elec. (Nov. 7, 2000)) repeal by implication statutes limiting the state's authority to use private contractors to perform architectural and engineering services on public works projects and thus allow state agencies to choose to contract out such services, or did the initiative merely accord the Legislature the as-yet unexercised power to authorize private contracting in this area? </p><p><strong>RES JUDICATA & COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL</strong></p><p><span style="color:#990000">Hernandez v. City of Pomona, S149499.</span> (1) Does an action against a police officer for injury resulting from the use of deadly force implicate a single primary right, such that a final judgment in favor of the police officer on a civil rights claim in federal court is res judicata in a subsequent negligence action in state court based on the same circumstances and injury? (2) Where a federal court renders a final judgment that a police officer’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and the court subsequently declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over a state law negligence claim, does the rule against splitting a cause of action bar a subsequent state court action on the negligence claim? (3) Does collateral estoppel bar a subsequent negligence claim based on “pre-seizure” conduct by the police officer that gave rise to the circumstances in which the officer was required to use deadly force?<br /><br /><strong>STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS<br /></strong><br /><span style="color:#990000">Beal Bank v. Arter & Haden, No. S141131</span><br />Is the limitations period for a legal malpractice claim tolled as to an attorney's former law firm while the attorney continues to represent the client in the same subject matter at his or her new firm?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Doe v. City of Los Angeles, No. S142546</span><br />Were plaintiffs’ claims against the City of Los Angeles and the Boy Scouts of America for sexual abuse by a city police officer while they participated in police department programs in the 1970’s barred by the statute of limitations, or did plaintiffs sufficiently invoke the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, section 340.1, subdivision (b)(2), which permits the revival of certain claims of sexual abuse that would otherwise be barred where the defendant "knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by<a name="sp_4041_445"></a><a name="SDU_445"></a><a name="citeas_40__40_Cite_as_58__137_Cal_46_App_46_4th_438_44___42_4"></a> an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person"? </p><p><span style="color:#990000">Shirk v. Vista Unified School District, No. S133687<br /></span>Does Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, which provides that the time for commencement of an action for damages from childhood sexual abuse is within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, extend the time limit for presenting a claim for damages against a public entity under the Government Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, section 900 et seq.)?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Hebrew Academy of San Francisco v. Goldman, No. S134873</span><br />When a publication containing an allegedly defamatory statement is available to the public but has a very limited distribution, does the statute of limitations on a defamation cause of action begin to run at the time of the first general distribution (the "single publication rule") or when the allegedly defamatory statement is or reasonably should have been discovered (the "discovery rule")?<br /><br /><strong>TORTS</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Castaneda v. Olsher, No. S138104<br /></span>May the proprietor of a mobile home park be required to provide security guards or take other security measures to prevent gang-related violence on the premises?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, No. S141643<br /></span>Can a public agency’s release of liability for recreational activities be effective as to ordinary negligence under section 1668, as interpreted by Tunkl v. Univ. of Calif. (1963) 60 Cal.2d 91, but not as to gross negligence? Supplemental briefing requested on policy arguments, in particular, whether enforcing releases of liability for future ordinary negligence, but not for future gross negligence, would lead to the demise or substantial diminished availability of recreational services and programs.<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Corder v. Corder, No. S138666</span><br />(1) Does the trial court in a wrongful death action have jurisdiction to apportion among the plaintiffs the proceeds of a settlement, or is the court's authority limited to apportioning an award of damages in such an action? (2) Was evidence that the decedent intended to divorce his wife admissible in an action to apportion a settlement in a wrongful death action, in the absence of any showing that such evidence was introduced in the wrongful death action itself or otherwise was considered in arriving at the amount of the settlement? (3) Did the evidence at the apportionment proceeding support the trial court's allocation of 90 percent of the settlement to the decedent's adult daughter and 10 percent to the decedent's wife?<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., No. S139184<br /></span>(1) Does the "sophisticated user" doctrine, which precludes a manufacturer's liability for failure to warn of a product risk that a sophisticated user should have recognized, apply in California? (2) If the doctrine applies, does it apply to strict liability causes of action and is a certified HVAC (heating, ventilation and air conditioning) technician a "sophisticated user" who should have known that noxious gas is created during maintenance and repair of air conditioning systems?</p><p><span style="color:#990000">Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin, No. S144831.</span> (1) Is a public entity liable under the Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) for an injury caused by a dangerous condition on the public entity’s property only if it acted negligently or wrongfully (see § 835, subd. (a)), or is it sufficient that the public entity created the dangerous condition (see § 835, subd. (b))? (2) Is the reasonableness of the public entity’s conduct in creating the allegedly dangerous condition an element of the plaintiff’s claim on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, or is it an affirmative defense on which the public entity bears the burden of proof?<br /><br /><span style="color:#660000">Ramirez v. Nelson, No. S143819</span><br />For purposes of liability under Penal Code section 385, which makes it a misdemeanor for anyone "either personally or through an employee or agent," to move a tool or equipment within six feet of a high voltage overhead line, was an unlicensed tree trimmer hired by homeowners to trim trees, including a tree with branches within six feet of a high voltage line, considered to be an employee of the homeowners? (See Lab. Code sections 2750.5, 6303, subd. (b).)<br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Seibel v. Mittlesteadt, No. S125590</span><br />Whether a post-judgment settlement agreement revising a damages award and providing for the parties to withdraw their appeals but not providing for an amended judgment and expressly preserving the defendant's right to bring a malicious prosecution action precludes a finding of favorable termination in that defendant's subsequent malicious prosecution action. </p><p><span style="color:#990000">Shin v. Ahn, No. S146114.</span> Is the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk applicable under the circumstances of this case in which defendant allegedly hit a golf ball from the tee without ascertaining the location of another golfer in his party and the ball struck and injured the other golfer?</p><p><strong>UNFAIR COMPETITION</strong></p><p><span style="color:#990000">In re Tobacco II Cases, No. S147345. </span>(1) In order to bring a class action under Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), as amended by Proposition 64 (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004)), must every member of the proposed class have suffered “injury in fact,” or is it sufficient that the class representative comply with that requirement? (2) In a class action based on a manufacturer’s alleged misrepresentation of a product, must every member of the class have actually relied on the manufacturer’s representations?<br /><br /><strong>UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE</strong><br /><br /><span style="color:#990000">Zengen Inc. v. Comerica Bank, No. S142947</span><br />(1) Under Division 11 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Cal. U. Comm. Code, section 11101 et seq.), does an accountholder's notification to a bank that wire transfers were "unauthorized" satisfy the statutory requirement that an accountholder "object to the payment" for purposes of allocating loss between the accountholder and the bank when a fraudulent wire transfer is made? (2) Are an accountholder's common law tort and contract claims against a bank arising out of fraudulent payment orders for wire transfers preempted by the provisions of Division 11? </p><p><strong>UTILITIES</strong></p><p><span style="color:#990000">Sprint Telephone PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego, No. S145541.</span> (1) Do the statutes that give “telephone corporations” the right to erect “lines and other necessary fixtures of their lines” in the public right-of-way (Pub. Util. Code §§ 7901, 7901.1) apply to wireless telecommunications providers? (2) Does section 7901.1, subdivision (a), which gives local governments the right to control the “time, place and manner in which roads . . . are accessed,” permit a county ordinance that regulates the aesthetics of cellular telecommunications towers erected in the public right-of-way?<br /></p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com1